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Abstract: Participation in value networks is vital for companies as competition has moved
increasingly to the level of company networks. Consequently, the growing
complexity of the globally networked business environment necessitates the
use of supportive tools in the management of network relations.
This Dissertation studies the value networks from two perspectives. First, as
companies expect a return on their contributions to the network, the Disserta-
tion constructs profit-sharing rules that serve as innovation incentives for the
network partners. Second, the Dissertation builds models for the identifica-
tion of network synergies in partner selection. The developments rest on game
theory, transaction cost theory, and multi-criteria decision analysis.
The results are normative in that the developed models give insight to decision-
makers at three levels: (i) the company decision-maker wants to optimise the
company’s participation in various networks, (ii) the network decision-maker
needs to incentivate the network partners to contribute to the network, and (iii)
the policy-maker aims to construct socially optimal instruments for the inno-
vation system. Overall, the use of jointly agreed profit-sharing rules and syn-
ergetic partnerships supports the attempts to reduce transaction costs, offering
benefits to the firms who participate in value networks.
Keywords: value networks, innovation management, profit sharing, partner selection,
game theory, transaction cost theory, multi-criteria decision analysis, mixed-
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Tiivistelmä: Yritysten osallistuminen arvoverkostoihin on yhä tärkeämpää kilpailun siir-
ryttyä yksittäisten yritysten tasolta yritysverkostojen tasolle. Tämän seurauk-
sena maailmanlaajuisesti verkottunut liiketoimintaympäristö on tullut niin mo-
nimutkaiseksi, että yritysten verkostosuhteiden hallinta edellyttää päätöksen-
tekoa tukevien työkalujen käyttöä.
Tässä väitöskirjassa tarkastellaan arvoverkostoja kahdesta näkökulmasta.
Ensiksi, koska yritykset odottavat tuottoja omasta toiminnastaan verkos-
ton hyväksi, väitöskirjassa kehitetään hyödynjakosääntöjä, jotka kannus-
tavat verkostokumppaneita innovoimaan. Toiseksi, väitöskirjassa raken-
netaan malleja verkostosynergioiden huomioimiseksi partnerinvalinnassa.
Tutkimus perustuu peliteoriaan, transaktiokustannusteoriaan sekä monikri-
teeriseen päätösanalyysiin.
Väitöskirjassa kehitetyt mallit ovat normatiivisia ja tuovat päätöksentekijälle
näkemystä kolmella tasolla: (i) yrityksen päätöksentekijä pyrkii optimoimaan
yrityksen osallistumisen eri verkostoissa, (ii) verkostopäätöksentekijä kannus-
taa verkostokumppaneita toimimaan verkoston hyväksi ja (iii) politiikantekijän
tavoitteena on rakentaa sosiaalisesti optimaaliset innovaatiojärjestelmän instru-
mentit. Ylipäätään verkostokumppaneiden kesken sovitut hyödynjakosäännöt
ja synergiset kumppanuudet auttavat vähentämään transaktiokustannuksia ja
hyödyntävät täten arvoverkostoihin osallistuvia yrityksiä.
Avainsanat: arvoverkostot, innovaatiojohtaminen, hyödynjako, partnerinvalinta, peliteo-
ria, transaktiokustannusteoria, monikriteerinen päätösanalyysi, lineaarinen
sekalukuoptimointi
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1 Introduction
The dominant view for the optimal level of companies’ diversification has evolved during the last
century. In the beginning of the 20th century, companies aimed at large-scale vertical integration
in order to benefit from economies of scale and a steady supply of raw materials. At the same time,
the first scholarly considerations for the optimal size of the firm were published (Coase, 1937).
The trend towards integration peaked in the 1960’s, when low interest rates tempted the companies
to grow through leveraged acquisitions, resulting in large conglomerates.
The conglomerates began to crack in the 1970’s with higher inflation, which raised interest rates
so that the conglomerates could not afford their debts. Not surprisingly, the financial crisis led
to the disintegration of the conglomerates. With the break-up of companies, Williamson (1975)
re-raised Coase’s (1937) theories of the boundaries of the firm into scientific discussion, now with
the well-known name transaction cost economics.
The next influential concept was the value chain, which categorises the activities of a company
into primary and support activities (Porter, 1985). Since its publication, the value chain has been
the dominant model for linear supplier-customer relationships. However, several issues caused the
need for extensions to the linear model. First, the share of services and other intangibles in business
increased. Second, the companies started to focus on their core competences (Hamel and Prahalad,
1990). Third, the computer networks improved the efficiency of inter-firm communications. In
consequence, value networks started to better characterise the multilateral business environment
(Normann and Ramírez, 1993; Christensen and Rosenbloom, 1995).
The multilateral nature of value networks implies that their coordination cannot be strictly cen-
tralised. Instead, much of the decision-making is decentralised to individual companies, wherefore
game theory offers well developed concepts for the modelling of the companies’ behaviour (My-
erson, 1997). Consequently, game theory has been applied widely to the study of supply-chain
relationships (Corbett and DeCroix, 2001; Li, 2002; Cachon and Lariviere, 2005). Nevertheless, in
the case of value networks, an essential part of the models is that they need to consider the network
as a whole. The opposed dyadic supplier-buyer models do not sufficiently address the network
phenomena, such as coalition formation.
This Dissertation studies the design of value networks further to the recognition that the network
companies seek to gain private benefits, albeit in collaboration with their network partners (Pa-
pers [I]-[III]). Since strive for the private benefit may lead to sub-optimal behaviour from the
network perspective, the network design needs to be robust in that opportunism is not the net-
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work partners’ privately optimal behaviour. Thus, a robust network design encourages the net-
work partners to contribute to the network. The results of this Dissertation suggest that suitable
ex-ante agreed profit-sharing rules steer the network partners away from sub-optimal behaviour
(Papers [I]-[III]).
The Dissertation contributes to managerial practises in two ways. First, Papers [I] and [II] construct
practically feasible profit-sharing rules that offer the network partners the incentive to contribute
to the network. Second, Paper [IV] builds models that support partner selection in the presence of
inter-organisational dependencies among partner candidates.
Each Paper [I]-[IV] presents a real-life case, highlighting the practical relevance of the network
models. Indeed, the management of complex value networks requires tools that support the design
of network structures. These tools are particularly valuable in cases which involve both cooperation
and competition, such as that of Paper [III], where the companies develop standards in cooperation,
but the resulting product markets are competitive.
The rest of this summary article is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the theoretical back-
ground and summarises the contributions of the Dissertation. Section 3 presents the main results
of the Dissertation, and Section 4 discusses the implications of the results and the modelling of
value-networks in general. Finally, Section 5 concludes with topics for future research.
2 Theoretical background and contributions
2.1 Game theory
The concepts of game theory are readily applicable to the analysis of value networks: companies
are the players, who make decisions so as to maximise their own pay-off according to a utility
function. The utility functions cater for the interdependencies between the players in that the
utility function of Player x maps the decisions of x and the decisions of the other players to x’s
utility scale. (Myerson, 1997)
In value networks, the participating companies strive for collaboration rather than competition. Al-
though the companies might not directly compete against each other, opportunistic behaviour may
still exist within partners whose commitment to the network is low. Typically, opportunism occurs
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as ‘free riding’, which refers to collecting benefits without contribution, or misuse of confidential
information, for instance (Axelrod, 1984; Nooteboom, 1999).
To escape the partners’ sub-optimal behaviour, the structure of the network needs to be such that
the partners’ local optimisation drives the network towards global value creation. In essence, value
creation requires the network to (i) reveal and prevent the possibilities of cheating, and (ii) construct
benefit-sharing mechanisms that encourage the companies to contribute to the network.
A number of game theoretic developments can be employed to analyse and design incentive net-
work structures. In his seminal papers, Nash (1950, 1953) axiomatised the bilateral utility-sharing
problem and formulated a corresponding unique rule for cooperative utility sharing. The origi-
nal idea is that the players’ outcomes in both disagreement and agreement have an impact on the
share. Alternatively, Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975) suggested replacing the Nash’s (1950) Axiom
of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives by the Axiom of Monotonicity. This replacement yields
another unique solution for two-player utility sharing. Nonetheless, in the case of transferable util-
ity, such as money, and assuming that both players have similar utility functions, the solutions of
Nash (1950) and Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975) coincide.
In games with several players, a subset of players can form a coalition, which complicates the
analysis. Shapley (1953) showed that there exists a unique rule—the Shapley value—that allocates
benefits among n players with respect to three widely accepted axioms. Furthermore, Harsanyi
(1963) included threats in the Shapley value. Kalai (1977), in turn, axiomatised the broad class
of proportional rules for n-player games. A common property for the above rules is that they
seek Pareto efficient solutions, which implies that the increase of benefit for one player implies a
decrease in another player’s payoff.
The above rules consider the static case of one-shot benefit sharing. Business, however, is dynamic,
whereupon the benefit-sharing rules need to account for future collaboration, too. For the dynamic
cases, a useful concept is Stackelberg games, where a leading player acts first, followed by a player
who reacts to the leader’s action (Bas¸ar and Olsder, 1982). For instance, in the context of value
networks, the leader’s problem is to construct benefit-sharing rules that encourage the followers to
contribute to the network.
In contrast to cooperation, all games that involve competition have at least one equilibrium, from
which no player wants to depart unilaterally (Nash, 1951). This equilibrium is the outcome of a
non-cooperative game with rational decision makers (DM). Since network relations often involve
both a cooperative and a competitive component, the identification of non-cooperative outcomes is
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relevant, too.
In cases where benefits accrue in the future, or which require the commitment of resources or
trust between the partners, the concept of repeated games has proven useful (Axelrod, 1984). The
idea of repetition is that although one-shot collaboration may be dominated by opportunism, the
repetition and accumulation of benefits makes long-term collaboration optimal to all players. In
game-theoretic terms, collaboration becomes the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium (Myerson,
1997).
2.2 Transaction cost economics
Transaction cost theory explains the companies’ behaviour through the extra costs incurred from
inter-organisational activity (Williamson, 1975). Two categories for transaction costs are, first,
ex-ante information collection, partner search, bargaining for prices, and contracting; and second,
ex-post adaptation of operations, monitoring, and contract enforcement, for instance (Williamson,
1985). Although the measurement of transaction costs is not accurate, activity based costing
(Cooper and Kaplan, 1988) offers a practical approach for the measurement (Degraeve and Rood-
hooft, 2000).
While transaction costs are inherent in all value networks, some network characteristics are likely
to reduce them. First, the size of the network impacts the total costs; the marginal value of new net-
work partners often turns negative after a certain point (Bakos and Brynjolfsson, 1993a,b; Noote-
boom, 1999). Second, since the possibility for opportunism increases transaction costs, young
relations are often characterised by strong governance and high transaction costs, but as the collab-
oration grows older, trust and informality instead of contracts reduces transaction costs (Parkhe,
1993; Woolthuis et al., 2005).
A relevant question is whether there exist structures that reduce the transaction costs of young
value networks. Interestingly, Parkhe (1993) concludes that game theoretic analysis of network
relations performed by managers contributes to the stability of the network. Indeed, game theory
forces the managers think of possible unwanted outcomes, which helps foresee and minimise the
impact of conflicts.
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2.3 Decision analysis
Companies typically make their decisions so as to maximise profits. The profits are the result of
incoming and outgoing cash-flows, which depend on the market success, on one hand, and e.g.
transaction, operation, and capital costs, on the other. Hence, the future cash-flows determine the
success of the decisions, as long as the time-value of money has been accounted for (McLean,
1958). However, the accurate estimation of future cash-flows at the time of decision-making is
normally unrealistic; the uncertainties in e.g. market development, competitors’ decisions, and
even future costs yield high uncertainties in the future cash-flows.
In cases where the estimation of future cash-flows at sufficient accuracy is practically impossi-
ble, the DM can try to identify other, more accurately measurable attributes or criteria, which
he/she deems to influence the cash-flows. The DM then estimates the performance of the deci-
sion alternatives with respect to the attributes, thus trying to identify the most preferred alternative
(Churchman and Ackoff, 1954). Various multi-criteria methods have been used for centuries. For
instance, Benjamin Franklin describes the method of “moral or prudential algebra” in his 1772
letter to Joseph Priestly (Hammond et al., 1998).
It is imperative for a network DM to make rational decisions. The rational decision-making was
axiomatised by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947) in their expected utility theory. Further-
more, multi-attribute value theory (MAVT) suggests that a rational DM can identify the most
preferred alternative by (i) normalising the performance scores, (ii) weighting the attributes by
non-negative weights that sum up to one, and (iii) calculating the weighted sum of the scores for
each decision alternative. The resulting additive value function ranks the alternatives in the DM’s
preference order, assuming certain independencies between the attributes (Debreu, 1960). The ad-
ditive model is practical because it leads to linear functions, which are computationally easier to
handle than for instance non-linear multiplicative models. (Keeney and Raiffa, 1993)
The DM cannot necessarily give perfect information on the relative importance of the criteria
(Steuer, 1976). Thus, several decision alternatives may be preferred, depending on the criteria
weights. In such cases it is useful to identify the Pareto-efficient alternatives, in which the im-
provement of one criterion implies a trade-off with another criterion. It is worth noting that this
demonstrates the connection between multi-criteria decision analysis and game theory; the criteria
correspond to the various players’ payoffs.
The outside world gives rise to numerous exogenous uncertainties, of which the rational DM identi-
fies the most influential ones. The exogenous uncertainties often provide the DM with real options,
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which are decisions that need to be made only after the DM has more information on the prevailing
conditions (Myers, 1977). The value of the real options lies in that they yield flexibility to the DM
allowing him/her react to new information. (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994)
The formulation of decision-making cases as optimisation problems is often beneficial. The benefit
of such formulations is that numerous solution techniques exist for various categories of optimi-
sation problems. Thus, much of the routine calculations can be computerised, and the DM can
focus on interpreting the results. Mixed-integer linear programming (MILP) formulations in par-
ticular have proven to be useful in many realistic cases, partially because of their flexibility for
modifications and computational tractability.
2.4 Contributions of the Dissertation
This Dissertation constructs normative models for the company DM to make better decisions in
value networks, when the aim is at efficient and structurally robust collaboration. The models
exploit game-theoretic concepts for multilateral decision-making, which involves both cooperation
and competition. Moreover, transaction cost theory is particularly useful in the study of inter-
organisational efficiency. Decision analysis and optimisation, in turn, are applicable in situations
that are best characterised by a centralised DM.
The empirical cases and the theoretical developments of Papers [I]-[IV] are in relation to two Pos-
tulates. First, Papers [I] and [II] describe two value networks—a ship-building network and a
roof-assembly network—where the explicit determination of incentive profit-sharing rules became
a prerequisite for continuous cost-reduction. Paper [III] studies the impact of profit sharing in a set-
ting where companies participate in standard-setting organisations. Since standards are open also
to companies who have not contributed to their development, the profit-sharing rules in standardi-
sation context need to provide the incentive to develop technology. The research of Papers [I]-[III]
relate to the first Postulate:
Postulate 1 There is no altruism in networks; companies aim to maximise own profits. Therefore,
structurally robust value networks have incentive, ex-ante agreed profit-sharing rules, which
steer the network towards global value creation.
Second, Paper [IV] describes a production network, where trust and collaboration history were
used as criteria in partner selection. The case highlights the importance of inter-organisational
synergies in partner selection, following the second Postulate:
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Postulate 2 Inter-organisational factors influence the success of the network. Thus, besides organ-
isational competencies, partner selection needs to account for the interdependencies between
partner candidates, too. Examples are collaboration history, inter-firm trust, and geographi-
cal distance.
The above Postulates are connected in that the design of robust value networks requires: (i) the em-
ployment of incentive profit-sharing rules and (ii) the selection of synergetic partner configurations
that minimise transaction costs. (Jarillo, 1988; Gulati et al., 2000; Zaheer and Bell, 2005)
Motivated by the empirical observations, this Dissertation contributes, first, by analysing and de-
veloping profit-sharing rules that can be used as incentives for innovation in value networks, and
second, by constructing multi-criteria partner-selection models, which incorporate the interdepen-
dencies between the partner candidates. Table 1 lists the research settings and particular contribu-
tions of Papers [I]-[IV].
Table 1: Contributions of Papers [I]-[IV]
Paper Research objective Methodology Results
[I] Construct profit-sharing
rules that encourage net-
work partners to process
innovations.
Stackelberg game: principal
sets the incentive so that it is
optimal for the network part-
ners to innovate.
Suggests three different
profit-sharing rules based on
theoretical analysis.
[II] Construct profit-sharing
rules that incentivate net-
work partners to cost
reduction and dynamically
account for the network’s
competitive position.
Real-option approach caters
for the dynamics of the busi-
ness environment. Other-
wise similar to the Stackel-
berg game of Paper [I].
Profit-sharing rule needs to
reward the innovator simi-
larly in different competitive
positions.
[III] Study the applicability of
proportional sharing of ben-
efits from patent licensing in
the context of technological
standards.
System dynamics mod-
elling for describing the
business environment. Non-
cooperative game theory for
determining the competitors’
optimal market-entry times.
Proportional sharing of ben-
efits is applicable from the
perspectives of technology
development and market
growth.
[IV] Construct a multi-criteria
partner selection model,
which accounts for the
interdependencies between
partner candidates.
MAVT to cope with the mul-
tiple criteria, and MILP to
identify the Pareto-efficient
network configurations.
New models for the incorpo-
ration of network interdepen-
dencies in partner selection.
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3 Robust structures for value networks
3.1 Ex-ante agreed profit-sharing rules
Collaboration in value networks typically requires some sort of commitment or contribution to the
network. Examples of such contributions are the re-organisation of workload (Paper [I]), the reve-
lation of cost information (Paper [II]), and the investments in technology development (Paper [III]).
However, in compliance with Postulate 1, the companies expect a return on their contributions.
If the company assesses that the expected return does not compensate the contributions, defective
participation, or ‘free riding’ becomes the dominant alternative (Axelrod, 1984). The fear of low
compensation is particularly present in value networks with young partnerships, low trust, and
possibilities for opportunism (Parkhe, 1993; Nooteboom et al., 1997).
The network can reduce the partners’ uncertainty on the compensations through ex-ante agreed
profit-sharing rules. Thus, Papers [I]-[III] develop and analyse profit-sharing rules that, firstly, en-
courage the network partners to contribute, and secondly, are practically feasible. The development
of the profit-sharing rules relies strongly on game-theoretic concepts.
As a result, not all profit-sharing rules are eligible. The rules need to be such that innovation is
rewarded, and the opportunity for unmerited rewards is minimised. Thus, the responsible construc-
tion of profit-sharing rules accounts for the following considerations:
• Theoretically sound rules measure the contribution and reward the partners respectively. In
contrast, if profit-sharing is based on costs plus profit margin, there is a risk that the network
partners show higher costs than what is appropriate. This risk is particularly present when
the partners belong to several networks.
• The measurement of the parameters needs to be practically feasible so that the effort does
not drain the benefits of innovation. Nonetheless, the strive for practicality may not lead to
the use of poor measures.
• Transparent and jointly agreed rules help foster trust between the partners, which in long-
term collaboration reduces transaction costs.
• The profit-sharing rules need to account for the dynamics of the value network and the sur-
rounding business world. Thus, profit-sharing cannot be seen as a static one-shot problem,
but instead as a continuous process throughout the life-cycle of the value network.
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There are indeed practically feasible rules that meet the requirements. Papers [I] and [II] consider
the case where the profit-sharing rule is an incentive for cost-reduction in networks with a principal
and several subcontractors. Here, the profit to be shared is the amount of cost reduction, in which
case there are three parties among whom the benefit is shared: (i) the subcontractors (Figure 1a),
(ii) the principal (Figure 1b), and (iii) the customer (Figure 1c).
A practically feasible profit-sharing rule accounts for the network’s competitive position (Porter,
1996) as follows. First, if the network is uncompetitive against its competitors, then a large share is
allocated for end-product price-reduction. Second, if the network already has a better price-value
position than its competitors, then the network partners can allocate profits among themselves.
Regardless of the competitive position, the innovating sub-contractors always receive the same
share, which eliminates their chances to benefit from the hold-up of cost-reduction (Figure 2).
In cases where the contribution is measurable, a practical rule is to share the benefits in proportion
to the contribution. The proportional rule is generally used in e.g. joint ventures, where the financial
investment is the measure of contribution. Paper [III] studies the case where the network partners
contribute to standard setting by investing into technology development. Here, the contribution is
measured as the number of the standard-related essential patents the companies accumulate. An
essential patent is a patent that is inevitably infringed if the standard is implemented. Since the
number of patents reflects the results of technology development, the proportional share according
to essential-patent numbers approximates the companies’ contributions.
Papers [II] and [III] in particular address the dynamic aspects of benefit sharing; the former presents
how real options need to be taken into account in profit-sharing rules, whereas the latter incorpo-
rates the companies’ market-entry decisions in the study of benefit sharing.
profit
Subcontractor
cost
Price paid to
subcontractor Subcontractor
subcontractor Principal
cost
End−product
price
Principal
profit
Price paid to
cost
Principal
profit
End−product
price
Price paid to
subcontractor Principal
a) Increase subcontractor profit b) Increase principal profit c) Decrease end-product price
Figure 1: Three objects of profit sharing
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Subcontractors
40 %
Principal
10 %
Customer
50 %
Subcontractors
40 %
Principal
40 %
Customer
20 %
a) Uncompetitive position b) Competitive position
Figure 2: Profit sharing related to position against competitors’ prices
Overall, the more transparent the value network, the easier it is to construct feasible profit-sharing
rules. In principal-subcontractor networks, open-book practises are a good way towards trans-
parency.
3.2 Synergetic network configurations
Selecting the right partners can be crucial for the success of the value network. Often, partner
selection cannot be made purely based on financial indicators, such as cash-flow estimates, because
the differences in the partner candidates’ performances are impossible to measure in monetary
terms. In the case example of Paper [IV], monetary criteria were the least important, because the
continuity of an important customership rests rather on successful project performance.
Thus, partners are often selected with respect to multiple criteria (Dean and Schniederjans, 1991;
Meade et al., 1997; Talluri and Narasimhan, 2003). There exist numerous criteria, according to
which partners are typically selected (for 183 evaluation criteria of individual companies, see Lin
and Chen, 2004). The most typical ones include quality, punctuality, learning capabilities, corpo-
rate image, and financial stability, for instance.
Further to Postulate 2, the sole use of partner-specific criteria neglects the possible gains from
synergetic effects. Nevertheless, synergy benefits due to for instance collaboration history, inter-
firm trust, geographic location, cultural compatibility, etc. can reduce transaction costs and promote
openness and innovation in the value network. Therefore, taking into account additional criteria
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AE&P
Alwo
Amsonic
Beni Burtscher
Brunner
Bühler
CCB
Fornara
Humbel
Innotool
Knobel
Okey AG
OMB
Schuler
Schär Engineering
SIG
SMA
Sulzer AG
Unima AG
VF AG
Wiftech
Figure 3: Collaboration history of twenty-one case companies (line thickness corresponds to in-
tensity of past collaboration)
that are measured for a set of companies helps identify network configurations that work better as
a whole.
To account for the network criteria, Paper [IV] develops models that incorporate these criteria
in MILP formulations for partner selection. An illustrative way to present the data on network
relations is a graph where the vertices and edges represent the companies and their interrelations,
respectively. For example, Figure 3 depicts the collaboration history of twenty-one case-companies
of Paper [IV].
The developed models can generally use graph representations as inputs for network criteria.
Moreover, the models enable the use of the total number of partners as a selection criterion. The
total number may be relevant if one partner can contribute with multiple competencies, and a
smaller total number of partners is preferred. The incorporation of these criterion-categories in
partner selection helps capture many of the success factors identified in transaction cost theoretical
studies.
MILP models allow the DM to identify Pareto-efficient network configurations using common
algorithms and solver libraries. Knowing the Pareto-frontier, the DM can focus the cost-benefit-
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risk and sensitivity analyses on the most potential network configurations, and thereby make the
final decisions manually. MILP models are also flexible to modifications and extensions, since
they accommodate well to linear constraints and objective functions. In general, the developments
of Paper [IV] are useful in portfolio-selection problems, where a subset of elements needs to be
identified from a larger set with respect to multiple objectives and constraints.
4 Discussion
The models of this Dissertation are useful for network decision-making at three levels. First,
the models help an individual company optimise its participation in various networks. Second,
the models support network decision-makers steer their network partners towards global value
creation. Third, the results give insight to policy-makers at the innovation-system level. Table 2
summarises the implications of this Dissertation.
Value-network models increase the understanding of complex network relations and open the way
for the optimal design of network structure. Formal optimisation, however, requires the estimation
of model parameters, which in some cases may turn out very difficult or overly expensive. In such
cases, the most important benefit of modelling is the conceptualisation and increased knowledge
of the business environment.
Besides parameter estimates, the other source of inaccuracy follows from the models’ limited
capability to describe the real world. The modeller needs to balance between the model’s com-
prehensiveness and amount of details, on one hand, and the clarity and computational tractability,
on the other. In any case, the responsible modeller firstly focuses on model validity; secondly, the
level of details determines the use of the model—whether it is sheer conceptualisation, or whether
it includes numerical calculations and optimisation, too.
If the main purpose of models is decision support, several issues are worth noting. First, the effort
of parameter elicitation must not be too burdensome. It is typically the experts of the organisation
who are solicited for this work, and there are demands for their time also in other activities than fill-
ing forms. Second, responsible use of numerical models does not seek unique optimum, although
the models may tempt towards narrow-sighted optimisation. Instead, it is more robust to identify
several good alternatives, on which the DM can focus his/her further assessment effort. Third, the
results of the models should undergo critical qualitative scrutiny that contrasts them with practical
experiences.
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Table 2: Implications of the Dissertation at three levels
Level of
analysis
Postulate 1: Innovation incentives and
profit sharing
Postulate 2: Synergetic partner selection
Company A rational company DM finds out the
profit-sharing mechanisms of its networks
and tries to restructure partnerships where
the other companies can benefit without ap-
propriate contributions to the network.
Anticipatory companies look beyond their
own partners. The partners’ partners and
their interrelationships yield a more holis-
tic view on the other companies’ intentions.
Network A robust network sets incentives that en-
courage the partners to contribute to the
network. The optimal incentives for long-
term relationships are jointly agreed, trans-
parent, and account for the dynamics of the
business environment.
Besides the partners’ competences, the suc-
cess of the network depends on the ef-
ficiency of collaboration. Hence, opti-
mal partner selection addresses the inter-
organisational dependencies between the
partner candidates.
Innovation
system
Transparent profit-sharing rules related to
the systemic instruments decrease the com-
panies’ contracting and litigation costs.
Responsible policies encourage risky re-
search and development and reward for fac-
tual results instead of empty rhetoric.
Networking with everyone is not valuable
per se. Thus, the incentives for syn-
ergetic collaboration between universities,
research institutes, and companies leave
space for self-organisation, too.
The network topology has an impact on the suitability of models. In very large networks compu-
tational tractability may restrict the use of combinatorial models (De Reyck and Herroelen, 1996).
Moreover, heterogeneity within the network partners complicates the modelling process, since var-
ious partners need to be modelled one by one. Besides the increased complexity, the topological
issues do not invalidate the results of this Dissertation.
Although this Dissertation focuses on centralised optimisation, largely heterogeneous or non-hier-
archical networks can be alternatively modelled with a decentralised approach (Lesser and Corkill,
1981). In this regard, the field of multi-agent systems (MAS) deals with autonomous entities—the
agents—that have private objectives and problem-solving skills and that share common protocols
for interaction (Sycara, 1998). The MAS models can offer solutions whose identification is difficult
for the centralised decision maker, particularly when the frequency of change or the complexity
of the systems increase (Marˇík and McFarlane, 2005). The profit-sharing and partner-selection
models of this Dissertation can be useful in MAS models where the agents strive to maximise their
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own benefit, while the socially optimal solution would be commonly desired.
Towards this end, several authors have approached coalition formation with MAS techniques.
Sandholm and Lesser (1997) study coalition formation in a setting where the agents’ rational-
ity is bounded by the performance of their algorithms and the cost of computational resources. In
such cases the DM faces a trade-off between the optimality of the solution and the cost of com-
putation, thus the solutions are typically sub-optimal with respect to the total value. Shehory and
Kraus (1998), in turn, take a MAS approach to task allocation where each task is to be performed
by a coalition of agents. Again, the presented any-time algorithms aim to maximise the total value
of the system, but the final solution is likely to be sub-optimal.
In recent years, also the European research community has been active in the study of network
phenomena with MAS models. Norman et al. (2004) consider holistic virtual organisation (VO)
management, which includes both VO formation and VO operation. First, the formation of the
VO follows a process where the agents bid for participation in a specific VO, taking into account
the quality of service. Second, the operation accounts for situations where reconfiguration of the
VO may be necessary. Furthermore, the MAS models of Hodík et al. (2005) distinguish between
the intra-enterprise and extra-enterprise levels in network-relations management. They propose
several use cases—including dynamic production planning, supply chain management, simulation,
and extra-enterprise information access—where MAS models can be beneficial.
This Dissertation is closely related to some recent results of the European research community.
First, the holistic VO creation framework of Camarinha-Matos et al. (2007) includes four tools,
namely (i) collaboration opportunity identification, (ii) collaboration opportunity characterisation
and VO rough planning, (iii) partners search and suggestion, and (iv) agreement negotiation. In
particular, Tool (iii) utilises the partner selection models of Paper [IV]. Second, Paper [IV] it-
self is influenced by Lavracˇ et al. (2007), who use collaboration history as a measure of inter-
organisational trust.
A managerial prerequisite for value-network modelling is the management’s willingness to con-
sider the network relations at the aggregate level. Exploiting models in decision support requires
the time and desire to understand the motives of model-building and to fine-tune the models into
the proper context. Therefore, model-based decision-making often requires the presence of the
modelling experts at least in the very first implementations.
Finally, the managerial relevance and usefulness of the models can be enhanced by gathering data
on the companies’ decision-making processes. The benefits of storing data derive from more ac-
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curate model validation and parameter estimation. Particularly in repeated decision-making pro-
cesses, data gathering for computer-assisted decision-making is likely to be beneficial. Besides
collecting data, the identification of future opportunities encourages the elicitation of scenarios
and the related real options, which can considerably improve the quality of decision-making (My-
ers, 1977).
5 Concluding remarks
The results of this Dissertation are summarised as follows. First, the construction and implemen-
tation of ex-ante agreed profit-sharing rules reduce the network partners’ uncertainty of the returns
on their contributions. The resulting increased transparency motivates the network partners to con-
tribute more, which results in higher potential for innovation (Postulate 1). Second, accounting for
inter-organisational dependencies in partner selection helps obtain a holistic view on the possible
network synergies. In contrast, these synergies are ignored in partner-selection models that only
account for the performance of individual organisations (Postulate 2).
In any case, the value of networking derives from appropriate combination of competences, as
long as the relevant partners have been identified, and the structure of the network is such that the
partners have the incentive to contribute. If either of these conditions is violated, there is a high
risk of inefficiency and free-riding in the network. The implications for innovation policies are
similar; socially optimal innovation systems reward for contribution and encourage risky research
and development, which is carried out in collaboration between universities, research institutes,
and companies. Nevertheless, the instruments of the innovation system should emphasise self-
organisation in partner selection instead of top-down network configuration.
The ever more rapid research and development and the globalisation of the networks calls for tools
that prevent the excessive increase of transaction costs and, besides the macro level, increase the
understanding of managers at the company level, too. When networks grow larger, they lose ef-
ficiency because of increased number of network relations. Moreover, combining complementary
competences to meet customer needs requires very broad knowledge; in large networks it is costly
to train people for such broad knowledge. This Dissertation is a contribution towards the better
management of network relations.
This Dissertation suggests several avenues for future research. First, since partnerships involve
the risk of inefficiency, a relevant question is when it is optimal to control the network through
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competition, and when it is more beneficial to strive for partnership. Answering this question
requires more research in terms of both empirical and theoretical studies. Second, more empirical
case-studies are needed to study the operationalisation of the theoretical results of this Dissertation.
Third, in knowledge-based networks the competences of various partners is intangible, in which
case it may be more efficient to transfer knowledge rather than money. More research is needed to
study the prerequisites for transferring intangibles within the network. Fourth, networks that offer
services need methods for service valuation and the further sharing of the service value among the
customer and the network partners.
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